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Medical Monitoring:
The Right Way and the Wrong Way
Victor E. Schwartz,* Leah Lorber,** and Emily J. Laird***
INTRODUCTION""
Most scientists and doctors believe that medical monitoring is only ap-
propriate when it has the potential to prevent or cure disease. At all times,
cost-benefit and risk-utility analyses must precede any implementation of a
medical monitoring plan. These principles are recognized by the courts that
prohibit claims of medical monitoring in the absence of present physical in-
jury. Yet, some courts have ignored the scientific and medical literature's
guidance on sound medical monitoring. Such courts have allowed medical
monitoring claims to proceed without evaluating the effectiveness, cost, and
risks of medical monitoring in a given case. In doing so, these courts have
brought about drastic changes to the common law. As this Article will show,
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these major changes are much better left to state legislatures. The legislature
is better equipped to make any far-reaching changes in the law because of its
information-gathering ability, prospective treatment of new laws, and broad
perspective. We have suggested this in the past.' Now time has shown-and
key state supreme courts have realized-this practical truth.
This Article discusses the accepted scientific and medical approach to
medical monitoring and explains the considerations involved. Next, the Arti-
cle outlines how courts have approached these issues. Then, it details the
reasons the courts are ill-equipped to implement medical monitoring causes
of action. Finally, the Article explains why the legislature is the institution
that should decide whether to implement medical monitoring as a valid claim.
I. MEDICAL MONITORING:
THE PREVAILING SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL PERSPECTIVE
Medical monitoring lawsuits "reach out across a long-standing divide
between personal injury litigation and public health. ' ,2 The scientific and
medical community views medical issues much differently than the legal
community. 3 Scientists and medical professionals, the true experts in the
field, view medical monitoring as one component of medical care and disease
prevention-a diagnostic tool tailored to detect the potential development of
specific diseases.4 In the courts, claims for medical monitoring are intended
to finance examinations for currently asymptomatic plaintiffs who have had
an exposure with the goal of detecting and treating the onset of disease. 5 Gen-
erally, for a medical monitoring claim in the courts, plaintiffs do not need to
prove they are presently injured.6
In contrast, the majority of doctors and scientists believe medical
monitoring programs, which generally pose some degree of risk to the pa-
l. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring-Should Tort Law Say
Yes?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1057 (1999).
2. David M. Studdert et al., Medical Monitoring for Pharmaceutical Injuries:
Tort Law for the Public's Health?, JAMA, Feb. 19, 2003, at 889, 890.
3. Cf Carl F. Cranor & David A. Eastmond, Scientific Ignorance and Reliable
Patterns of Evidence in Toxic Tort Causation: Is there a Need for Liability Reform?,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2001, at 5, 7 (vast differences between scientific
and legal thought on the issue of causation create "an uncomfortable interface be-
tween science and the law").
4. See generally Laura Welch & Pekka Roto, Medical Surveillance Programs
for Construction Workers, 10 OCCUPATIONAL MED.: STATE OF THE ART REVIEWS 421,
422 (Knut Ringen et al. eds., 1995).
5. See Arvin Maskin et al., Medical Monitoring: A Viable Remedy for Deserv-
ing Plaintiffs or Tort Law's Most Expensive Consolation Prize?, 27 WM. MITCHELL
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tient, must have the potential to be effective. 7 They believe medical moni-
toring is only appropriate when it could lead to the cure or prevention of
disease.8 To the mainstream medical community, "[d]ocumented effective-
ness is--or generally should be-the most basic requirement for providing
a health care service. It is a particularly important prerequisite for preven-
tive services, where the clinician has a compelling responsibility to 'do no
harm' to healthy patients."
9
Most doctors and scientists value medical monitoring in specific situa-
tions. They do not believe that medical monitoring is a preventive "cure all"
that can detect all types of diseases in all situations. The majority of medical
professionals disagree with the courts that believe a claim for medical moni-
toring is valid for any type of disease. One medical scholar notes:
The enthusiasm generated over the past several years for medical
monitoring, or as it is often called, medical surveillance, has been
extensive. The excessive claims made in its name in regard to the
prevention of disease have little or no relation to reality or objec-
tivity, and it would seem the time has come to recall A.J. Balfour's
apt comment, "It is unfortunate, considering that enthusiasm
moves the word, that so few enthusiasts can be trusted to speak the
truth."'
10
As we will show, application of the truth will prevent the creation of false
hopes and potential risk to patients.
A. A Look at Medical Monitoring from the Mainstream Scientific
and Medical Perspective: Its Definition and Requirements
To many medical professionals and scientists, "[m]edical monitoring of
a patient is a form of surveillance based on repetitive use of the same test or
test group to detect a specified change in the patient indicating a change in his
prognosis or need for treatment or a change in his treatment."'" Scientists and
7. See Myrton F. Beeler & Robert Sappenfield, Medical Monitoring: What Is it,
How Can it Be Improved?, 87 AM. J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 285, 286 (Myrton F.
Beeler et al., eds. 1987).
8. See id.
9. U.S. PREVENTIVE SERVICES TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., GUIDE TO CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES xxxv (2d ed. 1996), available at
http://odphp.osophs.dhhs.gov/pubs/guidecps/PDF/Frontmtr.PDF [hereinafter TASK
FORCE].
10. W.K.C. Morgan, Medical Monitoring with Particular Attention to Screening
for Lung Cancer, in OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISEASE 157, 157 (J. Bernard L. Gee et al.
eds., 1984).
11. Beeler & Sappenfield, supra note 7, at 285. It is important to distinguish the
medical monitoring claims discussed in this paper with medical monitoring, also
2005]
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medical professionals sometimes interchangeably refer to the terms "medical
monitoring," "medical surveillance," "medical screening," and "medical su-
pervision.'
12
Some doctors believe that, at times, medical monitoring has been mis-
used. 3 They suggest that medical monitoring "could probably be improved
merely by applying common sense and current concepts of medical decision
analysis."' 4 The leading medical and scientific communities believe that
common-sense concepts should govern medical monitoring:
Monitoring is indicated, generally, when the patient is at suffi-
ciently increased risk for [the disease being monitored] that one be-
lieves the potential benefits will outweigh the costs and potential
risk of monitoring. That implies that the benefits of detecting the
feared event before it has developed to the point of being obvious
clinically must be sufficient to justify monitoring. For this to be
true, obviously, the event itself must be serious enough, if un-
treated, to justify the treatment; and early treatment must be bene-
ficial. '5
We can break down this common-sense concept of appropriate medical
monitoring into four basic parts: Medical monitoring may be appropriate for
diseases when (1) detection is possible before the disease would typically
manifest itself through the patient's symptoms; (2) early detection can lead to
early treatment or cure of the disease; (3) the potential benefits of medical
monitoring outweigh its cost; and (4) the potential benefits of medical moni-
toring outweigh its risks.
16
called "medical surveillance," in the industrial hygiene context. Industrial hygiene
"[m]edical surveillance programs are designed to systematically collect and analyze
health information on workers exposed to hazardous materials. ... The end results of
this surveillance are used to take both preventive and ongoing action in the work-
place." Gary R. Krieger et al., Medical Surveillance and Medical Screening for Toxic
Exposure, in CLINICAL ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND Toxic ExPOSuRES 107, 108
(John B. Sullivan, Jr. & Gary R. Krieger eds., 2d ed. 2001).
12. Michael Gochfeld, Medical Surveillance and Screening in the Workplace:
Complementary Preventive Strategies, 59 ENVTL. REs. 67, 68 (1992).
13. See Beeler & Sappenfield, supra note 7, at 285 ("Improvement of monitoring
protocols for following specific medical problems might help lessen misuse of medi-
cal monitoring tests.").
14. Id.
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1. Detection Must Be Possible Through Medical Monitoring
Before the Disease Would Generally Manifest Itself
Through Patient Symptoms
The prevailing view of the medical and scientific community is that
medical monitoring is only appropriate when it might detect disease earlier
than the patient would learn of the disease as a result of experiencing symp-
toms. Health scientists note, "[i]f the health condition is not detected before a
worker would seek help anyway (e.g., when the worker becomes sympto-
matic), then medical surveillance has no additional preventive benefit."' 17
Following this principle, many scientists and medical professionals ad-
vise against medical monitoring for categories of diseases where symptoms
generally develop in patients at or before the time medical monitoring can
detect the diseases, such as some forms of cancer or nephrotoxicity resulting
from lead exposure.' 8 In these categories, medical monitoring becomes
"questionable and costly," not to mention redundant, because it alerts profes-
sionals to a problem no sooner than they would be alerted otherwise by a
patient experiencing symptoms of the disease.' 9
2. Early Detection of the Disease Through Medical Monitoring Must
Be Beneficial, Leading to Possible Treatment of the Disease
The mainstream scientific and medical community does not believe that
medical monitoring is always beneficial. As one medical professional has
said,
17. NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD ET AL., MONITORING THE WORKER FOR ExPOSURE
AND DISEASE: SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE USE OF
BIOMARKERS 32 (1990). See also Morgan, supra note 10, at 158 (citing the criteria
formulated by the World Health Organization, including "[t]here should be a recog-
nizable latent or early symptomatic stage" and "[t]here should be a suitable screening
test or examination for detecting the disease at the latent or early symptomatic stage,
and this test should be acceptable to the population," and noting these criteria are "as
apropos now as when they were first published").
18. See ASHFORD ET AL., supra note 17, at 32 (noting that "serum blood tests will
detect an elevated serum blood urea nitrogen (BUN) level in workers who have
nephrotoxicity as a result of lead exposure only after 66% of kidney function is lost or
when symptoms of renal failure are present"); James E. Cone & Jon Rosenberg,
Medical Surveillance and Biomonitoring for Occupational Cancer Endpoints, 5
OCCUPATIONAL MED.: STATE OF THE ART REVIEWS 563, 563 (1990) (noting that
"most tests for early signs of cancer do not provide significantly earlier diagnosis than
that based on the appearance of symptoms and thus merely lengthen the time between
diagnosis and death, without affecting outcome significantly").
19. See Krieger et al., supra note 11, at 108 ("Applying medical tests of little or
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the assumption that early diagnosis is always beneficial is falla-
cious .... If it is not possible either to cure or substantially im-
prove the prognosis of the condition, or failing that to delay mor-
bidity and mortality in those affected, then early detection is fu-
tile. 0
Because of this, many scientists and medical professionals have determined
that untreatable and incurable diseases are not appropriate for medical
monitoring.2 1 Examples of such diseases include mesothelioma, multiple
sclerosis, and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis.
22
The reason for this requirement is that early detection of an unalterable
or incurable disease may cause patients great distress. In these cases, "no
benefit from earlier diagnosis accrues and considerable psychological damage
may result from an earlier knowledge that the subject has developed an incur-
able disease."2 3 Since early detection can lead to great patient turmoil but
cannot lead to cure or treatment of the disease, the scientific and medical
community has deemed medical monitoring inappropriate in these situations.
20. Morgan, supra note 10, at 157-58 (noting that the goal of medical monitoring
"is to detect disease at an early or asymptomatic stage where cure or appreciable relief
of symptoms is possible" and citing medical monitoring criteria formulated by the
World Health Organization-"[t]here should be an acceptable form of treatment for
patients with recognizable disease" and "[t]reatment at the presymptomatic, border-
line stage of a disease should favorably influence its course and prognosis"--and
noting these criteria are "as apropos now as when they were first published"). See
generally Beeler & Sappenfield, supra note 7, at 285 (monitoring for the particular
disease must be "more effective early than later"); Brian Boehlecke, Medical Moni-
toring of Lung Disease in the Workplace, in OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISEASE 225, 225,
233 (J. Bernard L. Gee ed., 1984) (stating that medical monitoring may be used "to
detect individual workers with potentially reversible adverse health effects of expo-
sure" and stating "[slince the purpose of medical monitoring for case finding is to
detect abnormalities at a stage in which intervention will improve the prognosis, a
suitable means of intervention must be available if screening is to be worthwhile");
Cone & Rosenberg, supra note 18, at 570 (criticizing OSHA's carcinogen medical
surveillance program for a "[1lack of evidence for efficacy of the recommended test
methods to determine carcinogenic effects early enough to change the outcome");
Welch & Roto, supra note 4, at 422 ("The outcome the program is designed to detect
should be alterable; something can be done if an abnormality is found.... Further
diagnosis and treatment also should be available and acceptable.").
21. See Morgan, supra note 10, at 157.
22. See id.
23. Id. Considering mesothelioma, "a condition for which neither cure nor treat-
ment is available," one doctor notes, "at the present time such detection would be
inappropriate and could only lead to unnecessary anxiety." Id.
[Vol. 70
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3. The Potential Benefits of Medical Monitoring
Must Outweigh the Cost
The cost of a medical monitoring program should always be taken into
consideration in a decision to implement that program. Many doctors and
scientists caution, "[i]t is important that courts resist efforts to extend injury
surveillance to circumstances in which it does not serve health promotion
goals in a cost-effective manner."24 Instead, the cost of determining whether a
person has the health condition at issue, "(which would include the cost of
diagnosis and treatment)[,J needs to be economically balanced in relation to
possible expenditure on medical care as a whole."25 This cost analysis
"should have an increasing role in individual and public policy decisions
about providing preventive services." 26 "Properly used, cost-effectiveness
analysis incorporates and complements evidence of effectiveness to inform
recommendations on clinical preventive and other health care services."
27
Health professionals should always consider the attendant cost when
they evaluate tests proposed to monitor patients, thereby "screen[ing] out new
procedures or technologies that are poor uses of medical resources." 28 In fact,
"it is both reasonable and necessary for clinicians to consider cost-
effectiveness in many cases, weighing whether the marginal benefit to an
individual patient of a test, procedure, or treatment as compared to an alterna-
tive justifies its additional cost to the patient or to society as a whole.,' 29 Fol-
lowing this principle, the prevailing viewpoint among doctors warns that
"[a]pplying medical tests of little or no proven value to asymptomatic popula-
tions with low prevalence of disease is questionable and costly."
30
24. Studdert et al., supra note 2, at 893-94.
25. Morgan, supra note 10, at 158 (quoting WHO criteria). An important ele-
ment of the cost-benefit calculus is not only the cost of the monitoring, but also the
cost of treating any disease detected by the medical monitoring. See id. at 163 (stat-
ing, with regard to Mayo Clinic occupational lung cancer study, "it is apparent that
early detection cannot be equated with cure and the cost of curing one cancer detected
from the screening program will be appreciably greater and indeed enormous").
26. TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at xxxv. The U.S. Preventive Services Task
Force, convened by the Public Health Service to "rigorously evaluate clinical research
in order to assess the merits of preventive measures, including screening tests," U.S.
Preventive Services Task Force, available at http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/cps3dix.htm
(last visited May 19, 2005), includes an entire section on "Cost-Effectiveness and
Clinical Preventive Services" in its Guide to Clinical Preventive Services. See TASK
FORCE, supra note 9.
27. TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at xxxv.
28. Id. at xxxvii.
29. Id. See also Beeler & Sappenfield, supra note 7, at 285 (noting that for a
medical monitoring program, there must "be available an inexpensive, low risk, sensi-
tive test for the screening process").
30. Krieger et al., supra note 11, at 108.
2005]
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4. The Potential Benefits of Medical Monitoring
Must Outweigh the Risks
Doctors and scientists caution that the risks of medical monitoring
should not exceed the potential benefits. Because of the risks of medical
monitoring, doctors have noted that a patient's decision to participate in
medical monitoring "must be fully informed and voluntary and should be
preceded by a sufficient understanding of both the benefits and liabilities.
Some thoughtful observers believe that participants in medical surveillance
should sign informed consent forms."
31
Scientists recognize that medical monitoring is always risky to some ex-
tent because all screening programs may have adverse effects.32 For example,
colonic perforation is a risk of sigmoidoscopy, one particularly invasive form
of medical monitoring; impotence is a risk of the follow-up tests, biopsies,
and treatments that can follow prostate cancer screenings; and radiation expo-
sure always occurs in mammograms, a particularly troublesome risk for
women under the age of forty.33 Similarly, doctors believe that cancer screen-
ings often involve risks to the patient. In fact, one doctor serving as a plain-
tiff's expert witness in a medical monitoring case "acknowledge[d] the con-
siderable limitations of the currently known examinations and tests for the
early detection of cancer, as well as the fact that some, such as lung cancer
screening, create risks that outweigh the potential benefits."
34
Doctors note that the risks of medical monitoring include the risk of
false test results. 3 5 False negative test results are troublesome, as they can
31. Id. at 116.
32. See Boehlecke, supra note 20, at 236-37 ("One must also consider that like
all screening programs, those for cancer may have adverse effects.").
33. George W.C. McCarter, Medical Sue-Veillance: A History and Critique of
the Medical Monitoring Remedy in Toxic Tort Litigation, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 227,
276-77 & n.239 (1993) (citing U.S. PREVENTIVE SERVS. TASK FORCE, U.S. PUBLIC
HEALTH SERV., GUIDE TO CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES 49-50 (1989) (discussing
risks of sigmoidoscopy); Jane E. Brody, Nationwide Tests Set for Prostate Cancer,
but Doubts Surface, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1992, Section 1, at 1 (risks of prostate
cancer screenings); R.W. & Paula Dranov, Mammograms: When and Where?, AM.
HEALTH, Sept. 1992, at 54 (discussing risks of mammograms)).
34. Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep't of the Army, 55 F.3d 827, 848 (3d Cir.
1995).
35. False positives and negatives occur with a frequency that "depends on where
the 'normal' limits of the test are set. A test that measures biological distribution of
variables is normal when the result falls within a predetermined range of values."
ASHFORD ET AL., supra note 17, at 32. See Beeler & Sappenfield, supra note 7, at 287
(noting the "risks and costs of not adjusting treatment when change is truly indicated,
and of adjusting treatment inappropriately when change is not truly indicated");
McCarter, supra note 33, at 277 (discussing the problem of false positives, which "are
likely to foster a 'cry wolf' attitude in all [medical monitoring] participants," and false
[Vol. 70
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provide "false reassurance" and can take away incentives to change patient
habits that may worsen the progression of a disease. 3 6 Equally troublesome
are the effects of false positive test results. False positives can devastate pa-
tients and their families. 37 They can lead to costly follow-up medical proce-
dures which can cause further health complications and even death.38 As one
doctor notes, "[e]ven with all currently available diagnostic techniques, some
patients will be subjected to major surgical procedures for benign condi-
tions." 39 For example, a recent study of individuals who received spiral com-
puted tomography lung cancer screenings found that 98 percent of positive
results were false positives, and 25 percent of those tested were false nega-
tives.40 Those with false positive results "underwent thoracotomies only to
learn they had benign disease.",
4 1
The above risks must all be taken into account when determining
whether medical monitoring is appropriate in a given case.42
B. Medical Monitoring Programs Must Be Tailored to Specific
Diseases and Individuals: One Size Does Not Fit All
According to prevailing medical thought, medical monitoring tests must
be tailored to specific diseases and to specific individuals. Doctors cannot
simply slather a patient with "a batch of so-called routine tests," a practice
one scholar calls "biochemical bingo.
'A3
Rather, medical monitoring "necessitates the selection of appropriate
tests ... that will establish or point to the presence of the condition being
negatives, which "may even delay seeking treatment when warning symptoms ap-
pear").
36. See Krieger et al., supra note 11, at 108.
37. See id. ("An unfortunate reality of most screening programs is that the false-
positives greatly outnumber the true positives. False-negatives are also a significant
issue in that they provide false reassurance . .
38. Boehlecke, supra note 20, at 230.
39. Id. at 237. The author concludes this problem arises in the industrial hygiene
context, where "the cost and morbidity associated with further evaluation of workers
with positive results who do not have the condition may outweigh the benefits to
those true cases identified." Id. at 230.
40. See Daniel DeNoon, Docs Nix Lung Scan, WEBMD MED. NEWs, Feb. 22,
2002, available at http://my.webmd.com/content/Article/24/1822 50264.htm.
41. Laurel J. Harbour & Angela Splittgerber, Making the Case Against Medical
Monitoring: Has the Shine Faded on This Trend?, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 315, 320-21
(2003).
42. See Morgan, supra note 10, at 158 (recognizing these risks, the World Health
Organization's list of criteria for medical monitoring includes the criterion "[tihat the
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sought." 44 Choosing the appropriate criteria to govern medical monitoring
requires "knowledge of the pathophysiologic effects [of a given disease] so
that any recommended tests will result in its detection.'4 The goals of any
particular medical monitoring program will "depend upon the state of knowl-
edge about the causes of the condition of interest and the extent to which




Medical monitoring programs must also be tailored to the personal hab-
its of the individuals being screened.47 Additionally, an important element of
a medical monitoring program to medical professionals is providing health
promotion education, with the goal of changing the patient's behavior pat-
terns that increase the risk of disease.4 8 In sum, the scientific and medical
community believes medical monitoring programs are specific regimens that
must reflect patient histories and expected disease.
44. Id. In fact, medical professionals believe that:
Each test [included in a medical monitoring program] should be consid-
ered in terms of the following criteria: 1. Acceptance by subjects: safety,
comfort; 2. Simplicity: equipment and procedure; 3. Objectivity: not in-
fluenced by subject cooperation or observer bias; 4. Precision (reproduci-
bility): measurement error; equipment and observer true biologic variabil-
ity; 5. Accuracy: relation of quantity measured to what one wishes to
know; 6. Validity: sensitivity, specificity, and predictive value.
Id. at 159. See also Welch & Roto, supra note 4, at 425 ("To design an effective sub-
stance-specific or disease-specific monitoring program for construction workers, we
need to know the nature and extent of hazardous exposures, which workers have these
exposures, what diseases the exposures cause, and which workers are at risk from
exposure or from personal factors .... We need then to know the utility of the tests
and their predictive value."). Cf Cone & Rosenberg, supra note 18, at 564-70 (detail-
ing the specific designs of OSHA programs monitoring for cancer caused by specific
carcinogens); Welch & Roto, supra note 4, at 428-31 (detailing the specific health
conditions a medical monitoring program for construction workers must be geared to
detect).
45. Morgan, supra note 10, at 158-59.
46. RAYMOND S. GREENBERG ET AL., MEDICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 43 (2d ed. 1996).
See generally Cone & Rosenberg, supra note 18, at 578 ("Problems that have been
identified with monitoring employees for chemical carcinogens include ... the mar-
keting of technologies, particularly for biological markers of exposure, that are not yet
proven to be related to actual risk."); Welch & Roto, supra note 4, at 428-31 (describ-
ing specific medical monitoring programs for health conditions experienced by con-
struction workers).
47. See Welch & Roto, supra note 4, at 425.
48. See id. at 431 (noting information may be provided about nutrition, alcohol
consumption, and physical health promotion, for example). See also Gochfeld, supra
note 12, at 76.
[Vol. 70
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C. Medical Monitoring Programs
Must Evolve with Progressing Scientific Knowledge
Just as the criteria for an effective medical monitoring program will dif-
fer for each disease, the individual program criteria for detecting a particular
disease may vary over time. The criteria will "depend upon the state of
knowledge about the causes of the condition of interest and the extent to
which effective preventive measures are known. ' 49 According to medical
experts, "rapid advances in science and technology often cause rapid obsoles-
cence of accepted diagnostic and monitoring strategies., 50 New, more effec-
tive tests for various diseases are likely to be discovered and current tests are
likely to become outmoded. Over time, science may find that an exposure
previously thought to cause harm, in fact, does not. The need for medical
monitoring, therefore, would cease. Because of this, the purposes, goals, and
criteria of medical monitoring will evolve over time alongside the scientific
community's steadily advancing understanding of science. No one set of
court-established criteria can remain viable for long.
II. MEDICAL MONITORING AS PLAYED OUT IN THE COURTS
Over the past two decades a few courts have permitted medical monitor-
ing. 51 The first court to allow medical monitoring was the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Friends for All Children,
Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (FFA C). In FFAC, the defendant's airplane
was used in a rescue mission to evacuate Vietnamese children from Saigon at
the end of the Vietnam War. 53 Tragically, the plane crashed mid-flight due to
the decompression of the interior compartments.54 FFAC, the legal guardian
for the surviving children, sought compensation from Lockheed for diagnos-
tic examinations to determine if the decompression or the crash itself caused
residual brain dysfunction syndrome in the children.
55
Predicting the approach of courts in the District of Columbia, the D.C.
Circuit held that a medical monitoring remedy should be recognized. 56 In its
reasoning, the court concluded medical monitoring would not be necessary
"but for the fact that these children endured explosive decompression and
49. GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 46, at 43.
50. Beeler & Sappenfield, supra note 7, at 287.
51. See McCarter, supra note 33, at 231-42 (giving a detailed history of medical
monitoring jurisprudence).
52. 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
53. Id. at 819.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 824-25.
2005)
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hypoxia aboard [the] plane." 57 The court further held that the need for medi-
cal monitoring constituted an "injury" within the definition of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, 58 because "an individual has an interest in avoiding
expensive diagnostic examinations just as he or she has an interest in avoid-
ing physical injury."59
In this case, the court carefully limited medical monitoring. It allowed
only comprehensive diagnostic testing, rather than continued lifetime medical
monitoring. Also, the award in this case arose out of a traumatic physical
impact, a very different situation from a toxic tort action where the direct
causal effects of an alleged wrongdoing may be harder to identify. The court
made clear it intended to restrict medical monitoring to cases where the plain-
tiffs injury is not speculative. 61 The court also sought to prevent plaintiffs
from recovering excessive damages, expressing its concern with the hardship
its holding would impose upon the defendant. 62 These legitimate concerns led
the court to impose three fundamental requirements. First, to ensure payments
to plaintiffs actually went toward monitoring, a fund was created to disperse
money only to plaintiffs who submitted a voucher detailing their anticipated
expenses. 63 Second, to ensure the tests given to plaintiffs were necessary, a
panel of psychologists, psychiatrists, and neurologists were to provide input
on tests a particular child should undergo. 64 Third, the court designated that
any funds remaining in the interest-bearing medical monitoring fund after the
completion of the plaintiffs' exams were to be returned to the defendant.
65
The court also took steps to prevent redundant testing. The court re-
quired a doctor's review of what tests a child had already undergone before
allowing more tests, in an attempt to eliminate unnecessary duplication.
66
Importantly, the court ensured its decision avoided double recovery by some
plaintiffs through collateral sources: it limited medical monitoring relief to
the children adopted in countries that did not have public health systems that
would pay for the children's medical examinations.
67
In sum, there were many key reasons that supported the medical moni-
toring ruling in FFAC, but other courts in other jurisdictions have knocked
these legs down. As we will show, some other courts have allowed medical
monitoring in cases where there was no physical injury. Although the FFAC
57. Id. at 825.
58. The Restatement defines "injury" as "the invasion of any legally protected
interest of another." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(1) (1965).
59. FFAC, 746 F.2d at 826.
60. Id. at 823.
61. Id. at 826 (The injury must be "neither speculative nor resistant to proof.").
62. Id. at 823.
63. Id. at 823, 831.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 823 n.10.
66. Id. at 835 n.34.
67. Id. at 822 n.7 (allowing recovery only for the French plaintiffs).
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court noted it intended to limit medical monitoring awards to cases where the
injury is not speculative, some courts have not applied that limitation. For
example, medical monitoring has been allowed in some speculative chemical
exposure cases.68 Additionally, very few other courts mandated a court-
supervised fund to counter concerns about lump-sum awards and to make
sure that recoveries were actually spent on monitoring.
69
Today, eleven states plus the District of Columbia allow medical moni-
toring in the absence of present physical injury.70 As we will show, however,
these early decisions on medical monitoring do not reflect the current trend.
In fact, the clear trend in the courts has been away from allowing medical
monitoring when people have no current injury.7 1 These cases reflect a judi-
68. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987), was one of the first
toxic exposure cases to recognize medical monitoring. Ayers was brought by 339
plaintiffs from Jackson, New Jersey, after toxic pollutants from the town's landfill
leaked into the town aquifer and contaminated the plaintiffs' drinking water. Id. at
291. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed a lump-sum award of over $8.2 million
to cover the cost of plaintiffs' future medical check-ups. Id. The court later retreated
from its holding. See Theer v. Philip Carey Co., 628 A.2d 724, 733 (N.J. 1993)
("medical surveillance damages are not available for plaintiffs who have not experi-
enced direct and hence discrete exposure to a toxic substance and who have not suf-
fered an injury or condition [as a result]"). See also, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB
Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 850-51 (3d Cir. 1990) (In a case where plaintiffs feared exposure
to PCBs, the court held that plaintiffs who can demonstrate that medical monitoring is
"reasonably anticipated" can demonstrate an economic injury.); Cook v. Rockwell
Int'l Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468, 1474 (D. Colo. 1991) (allowed medical monitoring
under CERCLA for hazardous waste exposure where plaintiffs could prove that moni-
toring was necessary to test the environmental effects of a release or threatened re-
lease of hazardous waste); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 823
(Cal. 1993) (allowed medical monitoring for toxic waste contamination of plaintiffs'
drinking water); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993)
(allowed medical monitoring for asbestos exposure).
69. See In re Paoli, 916 F.2d 829; Cook, 755 F. Supp. 1468; Potter, 863 P.2d at
825 n.28 (discussed but did not mandate court-supervised fund); Hansen, 858 P.2d at
982 (discussed but did not mandate court-supervised fund). But see Redland Soccer
Club, Inc. v. Dep't of the Army, 696 A.2d 137, 142 n.6 (Pa. 1997).
70. These jurisdictions include: Arizona (Bums v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752
P.2d 28 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)); California (Potter, 863 P.2d 795); Colorado (Cook,
778 F. Supp. 512); District of Columbia (Friends for All Children v. Lockheed Air-
craft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); Florida (Petito v. A.H. Robins Co., 750
So. 2d 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)); Illinois (Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 793
N.E.2d 869 (I11. App. Ct. 2003)); Montana (Lamping v. Am. Home Prods. Inc., No.
DV-97-85786/93 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Feb. 2, 2000)); New Jersey (Ayers, 525 A.2d 287);
Ohio (Day v. NLO, 851 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Ohio 1994)); Pennsylvania (Redland
Soccer Club, 696 A.2d 137); Utah (Hanson, 858 P.2d 970); and West Virginia
(Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424 (W. Va. 1999)).
71. Jurisdictions that do not allow medical monitoring claims absent present
physical injury include: Alabama (Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827 (Ala.
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cial understanding that is in harmony with that of the mainstream scientific
and medical community: medical monitoring is only appropriate where it can
be expected to be effective and where its benefits outweigh its costs. 72 A ba-
sic objective "predictor" for this result is some contemporary injury or harm.
In contrast, other courts have ignored this medical and scientific guidance-and
have instead implemented full-scale medical monitoring awards where the
plaintiffs have no present physical injury.73
A. A Number of Courts, Including the United States Supreme Court,
Have Wisely Rejected Medical Monitoring
Absent Present Physical Injury
The Supreme Court of the United States refused to recognize medical
monitoring as a cause of action under the pro-plaintiff Federal Employers'
Liability Act ("FELA") 74 in the landmark case Metro-North Commuter Rail-
road Co. v. Buckley.75 Over the past few years, the supreme courts of Nevada,
Alabama, and Kentucky all have similarly rejected medical monitoring
claims.76 In doing so, these courts have reaffirmed the fundamental tort law
principle that damages are not recoverable absent a present physical injury.77
2001)); Connecticut (Goodall v. United Illuminating, No. X04CV 950115437S, 1998
WL 914274 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 1998)); Indiana (Baker v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 70 F.3d 951 (7th Cir. 1995)); Kentucky (Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82
S.W.3d 849 (Ky. 2002)); Louisiana (LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1997 &
Supp. 2005)); Michigan (Myerhoff v. Turner Constr. Co., 575 N.W.2d 550 (Mich.
1998)); Missouri (Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)); Ne-
braska (Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2000)); Nevada (Badillo v.
Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435 (Nev. 2001)); New York (Abusio v. Consol. Edison
Co. of N.Y., Inc., 656 N.Y.S.2d 371 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)); North Carolina (Carroll
v. Litton Sys., Inc., No. B-C-88-253, 1990 WL 312969 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 29, 1990)
(mem.)); Oregon (Mead v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., No. 0107-07137 (Or. Cir. Ct. Oct. 8,
2003)); South Carolina (Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., No. CIV.A. 9:99-2280-18RB, 2001
WL 34010613 (D. S.C. Mar. 30, 2001) (mem.)); Virginia (Ball v. Joy Tech. Inc., 958
F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1991)); and Washington (Garcia v. Aventis Pasteur Inc., No. 01-2-
27335-3-SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. Apr. 7, 2003)).
72. See Beeler & Sappenfield, supra note 7, at 286.
73. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
74. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2000). FELA defines rights and duties in personal injury
cases brought by railroad workers against their employer railroads. FELA is the tort
equivalent of workers' compensation in the railroad field.
75. 521 U.S. 424 (1997).
76. See Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435 (Nev. 2001); Hinton v. Mon-
santo Co., 813 So. 2d 827 (Ala. 2001); Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849
(Ky. 2002).
77. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 165
(5th ed. 1984) ("Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another [is a neces-
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1. The United States Supreme Court Has Reviewed
and Rejected Medical Monitoring
In Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley,78 the United States
Supreme Court ruled 7-2 against allowing a medical monitoring claim
brought under FELA by a pipefitter against his railroad employer for occupa-
tional exposure to asbestos.
79
The case involved sympathetic plaintiffs who had literally been covered
with asbestos while working for the railroad. Still, the Court did not allow a
medical monitoring claim. Instead, the Court closely considered the serious
policy concerns accompanying the adoption of a medical monitoring cause of
action. These concerns are similar to those recognized by the scientific and
medical community. They include the difficulty of identifying which medical
monitoring costs exceed the costs of preventative medicine ordinarily rec-
ommended for everyone, which particular tests or treatments are appropriate
in a given case, and which adjustments need to be made based upon an indi-
vidual plaintiff's unique medical needs.
81
The United States Supreme Court appreciated that medical monitoring
absent actual physical injury could permit literally "tens of millions of indi-
viduals" to "justify some form of substance-exposure-related medical moni-
toring.' 82 Defendants, in turn, would be exposed to potentially unlimited li-
ability, and a "'flood' of less important cases" would drain the pool of re-
sources available for meritorious claims by plaintiffs with serious, presentinjury.83 Further, the Court rejected the argument that medical monitoring
awards are not costly.84 The Court also feared that allowing medical monitor-
ing claims could create double recoveries because alternative, collateral
sources of payment, such as health insurance, are often available to those
seeking money for medical monitoring.
85
Importantly, the Court distinguished medical monitoring for toxic torts
from claims arising from traumatic events where subsequent injuries can be
sary element of a negligence cause of action].... The threat of future harm, not yet
realized, is not enough.").
78. 521 U.S. 424 (1997).
79. Id. Over the years, FELA has been subject to construction that is very favor-
able to plaintiffs. See, e.g., Beeber v. Norfolk S. Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1364, 1372 (N.D.
Ind. 1990) ("If the defendant's negligence, however slight, plays any part in produc-
ing plaintiff's injury, the defendant is liable."); Pry v. Alton & S. Ry. Co., 598 N.E.2d
484, 499 (I11. App. Ct. 1992) (stating that, under FELA, "[o]nly slight negligence of
the defendant needs to be proved.").
80. Metro-North, 521 U.S. at 444, 447.
81. See id. at 441-42.
82. Id. at 442.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 442-43.
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fairly traceable. The Court explicitly stated that Friends for All Children, Inc.
v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.86 (FFAC) was neither applicable nor persuasive in
a case alleging harm "through negligent exposure to a toxic substance," not-
ing that FFAC involved the "special recovery-permitting circumstance[]" of
"the presence of a traumatic physical impact." 87
2. The Supreme Court of Nevada Has Refused
to Recognize Medical Monitoring
Recently several state supreme courts have followed the United States
Supreme Court's guidance. Badillo v. American Brands, Inc., before the
Nevada Supreme Court, involved a collection of smokers and casino workers
who brought class actions seeking the establishment of a court-supervised
medical monitoring program to aid the early diagnosis and treatment of al-
leged tobacco-related illnesses. 89 The Nevada Supreme Court, responding to a
certified question from the United States District Court for the District of
Nevada, held that "Nevada common law does not recognize a cause of action
for medical monitoring." 9 The court recognized that "[m]edical monitoring is
a novel, non-traditional tort and remedy."91 The court also noted that chang-
ing fundamental tort law rules raises important public policy choices that
should be left to legislatures. The court stated: "Altering common law rights,
creating new causes of action, and providing new remedies for wrongs is
generally a legislative, not a judicial, function." 92
3. The Supreme Court of Alabama Has Rejected Medical Monitoring
Claims in the Absence of a "Manifest, Present Injury"
The Alabama case, Hinton v. Monsanto Co.,93 involved a claim by a
citizen who alleged that he had been exposed to polychlorinated biphenyls
("PCBs") that were reportedly released into the environment by the defen-
dant.94 As in Nevada, the Alabama Supreme Court refused to recognize a
medical monitoring cause of action in the absence of a "manifest, present
injury., 95 The court stated that "[t]o recognize medical monitoring as a dis-
tinct cause of action ... would require this Court to completely rewrite Ala-
86. 446 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
87. Metro-North, 521 U.S. at 440.
88. 16 P.3d 435 (Nev. 2001).
89. Id. at 438.
90. Id. at 441.
91. Id. at 438.
92. Id. at 440.
93. 813 So. 2d 827 (Ala. 2001).
94. Id. at 828.
95. Id. at 829.
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bama's tort-law system, a task akin to traveling in uncharted waters, without
the benefit of a seasoned guide"---a voyage upon which the court was "un-
prepared to embark.,
96
The court also detailed a number of public policy concerns, such as a
potential avalanche of claims and the unlimited liability exposure for defen-
dants.97 It also realized that "'a "flood" of less important cases"' would drain
the pool of resources available for meritorious claims by plaintiffs with seri-
ous, present injuries and would adversely affect the allocation of scarce medi-
cal resources. 98 The court concluded: "we find it inappropriate ... to stand
Alabama tort law on its head in an attempt to alleviate [plaintiffs'] concerns
about what might occur in the future. We believe that Alabama law ... pro-
vides no redress for a plaintiff who has no present injury or illness." 99
4. The Supreme Court of Kentucky's Recent Ruling Signals a
Clear Trend by Courts Away from Medical Monitoring
Most recently, the highest court in Kentucky joined those in Nevada and
Alabama in rejecting medical monitoring claims. In Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst
Laboratories,'00 the plaintiff, on behalf of herself and as representative for a
class of patients, sought the creation of a court-supervised medical monitor-
ing fund to detect the possible onset of primary pulmonary hypertension from
ingesting the "Fen-Phen" diet drug combination.' 
0
'
The Kentucky Supreme Court, citing cases dating as far back as 1925,
recognized that "[t]his Court has consistently held that a cause of action in
tort requires a present physical injury to the plaintiff."'' 0 2 The court noted that
the same basic requirement governed recent toxic tort cases, where it had
decided that "'until such time as the plaintiff can prove some harmful result
from the exposure ... his cause of action has yet to accrue."" 0 3 The court
then concluded that "all of these cases lead to the conclusion that a plaintiff
must have sustained some physical injury before a cause of action can accrue.
To find otherwise would force us to stretch the limits of logic and ignore a
long line of legal precedent."'04
96. Id. at 830.
97. Id. at 830-3 1.
98. Id. at 831 (quoting Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S.
424, 442 (1997)).
99. Id. at 831-32.
100. 82 S.W.3d 849 (Ky. 2002).
101. Id. at 851.
102. Id. at 852.
103. Id. at 853 (quoting Capital Holding Corp. v. Bailey, 873 S.W.2d 187, 195
(Ky. 1994)) (alteration in original).
104. Id. at 853-54. A recent Sixth Circuit decision applying Kentucky law rein-
forced the public policy reasons against allowing claims absent present physical in-
jury. In Rainer v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 03-6032, 2005 WL 525235 (6th Cir.
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B. The Unsound Alternative. The West Virginia "Anyone Can Sue"
Approach to Medical Monitoring
West Virginia provides a practical example of the adverse impacts of al-
lowing medical monitoring claims when the plaintiffs have not been injured.
In 1999, in Bower v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,10 5 the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia established an independent cause of action allowing
an individual to recover future medical monitoring costs absent physical in-
jury. 10 6 In that case, the plaintiffs, who had no symptoms of any disease, al-
leged that they were exposed to toxic substances as a result of the defendants'
maintenance of a pile of broken glass debris from the manufacture of light
bulbs.'
0 7
The court's holding in Bower stands in stark contrast to the medical and
scientific perspective that medical monitoring programs should only be im-
plemented for patients who have potentially treatable or curable disease. In-
stead, the court held that a suit can be filed even if the amount of exposure to
a toxic substance does not correlate with a level sufficient to cause injury10 8
or if there is no effective treatment available for the disease.'0 9 The court also
rejected the argument that any funds awarded should be awarded in a court-
Mar. 8, 2005), the court determined that like medical monitoring claims, claims of
subcellular damage to DNA and chromosomes without any salient clinical symptoms
cannot be sustained as a matter of public policy. The court reasoned that
"Given that negligently distributed or discharged toxins can be perceived
to lie around every comer in the modem industrialized world, and their ef-
fects on risk levels are at best speculative, the potential tort claims in-
volved are inherently limitless and endless." Accepting the plaintiffs'
claim would therefore throw open the possibility of litigation by any per-
son experiencing even the most benign subcellular damage. Based upon
the average American's exposure to chemically processed foods, toxic
fumes, genetically modified fruits and vegetables, mercury-laden fish, and
hormonally treated chicken and beef, this might encompass a very large
percentage of the total population. Nowhere in their arguments do the
plaintiffs address these "floodgate" concerns.
Id. at *12 (quoting Wood, 82 S.W.3d at 857-58) (citation omitted).
105. 522 S.E.2d 424 (W. Va. 1999). In February 2003, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals applied Bower to reverse a circuit court order denying class certifi-
cation to five thousand users of an allegedly defective prescription drug, Rezulin, who
sought to recover costs of medical monitoring. See In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig., 585
S.E.2d 52 (W. Va. 2003).
106. Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 432-33.
107. Id. at 426-27.
108. Id. at 433 (noting that "[i]mportantly, 'no particular level of quantification is
necessary"') (quoting Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979 (Utah
1993)).
109. Id. at 434.
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administered fund and instead awarded funds to plaintiffs in a lump sum." 0
Rather than being guided by principles of effective treatment or cure of dis-
ease, the court's ruling unabashedly allows for medical monitoring based on
"the subjective desires of a plaintiff for information concerning the state of
his or her health.""'1
The court's criteria for medical monitoring do not require a cost-benefit
analysis, in stark contrast to scientific recommendations. It requires, instead,
"that the plaintiff ha[ve] a significantly increased risk of contracting a par-
ticular disease relative to what would be the case in the absence of expo-
sure." 112 The court's medical monitoring criteria state that this significantly
"increased risk" must make it "reasonably necessary" to undergo medical
monitoring that could allow early detection of the disease.' 3 The court noted
that "factors such as financial cost and the frequency of testing need not nec-
essarily be given significant weight."'
' 14
Medical monitoring is a primary reason the rulings of courts in West
Virginia are considered unfair and imbalanced. 115 Respected torts scholars
James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski, Reporters for the American
Law Institute's Restatement of Torts, Third: Products Liability, criticize
Bower's "superlative"-riddled criteria.11 6 They note that Bower's criteria
"will not prevent most well-prepared cases from reaching triers of fact. There
is no escaping the conclusion that defendants in these medical monitoring
cases face potentially crushing liabilities."'17 Despite this criticism, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has rejected attempts to institute stricter,




I11. Id. at 433.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 432.
114. Id. at 433.
115. See Robert D. Mauk, McGraw Ruling Harms State's Reputation in Law,
Medical Monitoring, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Mar. 1, 2003, at 5A ("[T]he Bower
medical-monitoring ruling has cast a shadow over our state's reputation in the legal
field. It affects West Virginia jobs, taxes, health care and the public credibility of our
courts."); see also Editorial, Legislators Need to Restrict the Legal Industry on this
One, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Feb. 19, 2003, at 4A ("People should be compen-
sated for injuries caused by the negligence of others. But lawyers should not profit
from imaginary harm.").
116. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone
Mad: Exposure-based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical
Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. REv. 815, 845 (2002).
117. Id. (footnote omitted).
118. See In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig., 585 S.E.2d 52, 73 (W. Va. 2003). In this
case, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed a lower court's denial of
the class certification of five thousand plaintiffs with medical monitoring claims in
the diet drugs litigation. Id. at 76. The West Virginia Supreme Court rejected the
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As a result of Bower, uninjured plaintiffs in West Virginia can sue under
a distinct medical monitoring cause of action even when the level of exposure
is not sufficient to cause disease. Furthermore, they do not have to spend any
of their award on medical monitoring. In a dissenting opinion in the case,
Justice Maynard asserted, "the practical effect of [the Bower] decision is to
make almost every West Virginian a potential plaintiff in a medical monitor-
ing cause of action."'1 19 This appears to be what has occurred.
It used to be that only sick smokers sued cigarette makers. But shortly
after the Bower decision, plaintiffs' lawyers filed a class-action suit seeking
medical monitoring damages against the major cigarette manufacturers on
behalf of approximately 250,000 West Virginia smokers who had not been
diagnosed with any smoking-related illnesses. 120 In November 2001, the jury
found that medical monitoring was unnecessary, that cigarettes are not a de-
fective product, and that cigarette makers "were not negligent in designing,
making or selling them."1 21 Nevertheless, the process of trying such a case is
an extraordinary waste ofjudicial resources.
lower court's approach of using more stringent medical monitoring criteria than set
forth in Bower to determine that the claims of the class action did not predominate. Id.
The lower court used the following scientifically-based criteria for medical monitor-
ing: that (1) the disease in question progresses asymptomatically following toxic
exposure; (2) a diagnostic test with high sensitivity exists; (3) the exposed population
has a relatively high prevalence of disease; (4) the diagnostic test therefore has a high
predictive value; (5) the test is relatively low-cost; (6) medical monitoring could be
integrated into standard clinical follow-up of those with disease; (7) monitoring could
lead to early preventive care; and (8) monitoring allows for the appropriate timing of
definitive treatment In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig., No. CIV. A. 00-C-i 180-H, 2001 WL
1818442, at *11 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 2001), rev'd, 585 S.E.2d 52 (W. Va. 2003).
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals enforced the Bower criteria and ruled
that since the plaintiffs' claims all met the Bower criteria, commonality prevailed. In
re W. Va. Rezulin Litig., 585 S.E.2d at 73.
119. Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 435 (W. Va. 1999)
(Maynard, J., dissenting).
120. See In re Tobacco Litig. (Medical Monitoring Cases), Civ. Action No. 00-C-
6000 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. 2001) (also known as "the Blankenship case").
121. See Vicki Smith, Jury Rejects Smokers' Suit Seeking Free Medical Tests;
Case 1st of Kind in U.S., CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Nov. 15, 2001, at 12A. The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is currently considering the plaintiffs' appeal of
the verdict and request for another trial. See Chris Wetterich, Smokers Want Another
Trial; Evidence Unheard, Lawyers Argue, in Medical Monitoring Lawsuit,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Nov. 6, 2003, at IC.
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C. Courts Have Not Implemented Medical Monitoring Programs
that Meet the Goals and Purpose of Medical Monitoring,
as Seen by the Scientific and Medical Community
Courts tread on quicksand when they liberally allow medical monitoring
claims. Since exposure to potentially harmful products is so widespread, "the
universe of potential medical monitoring plaintiffs seems vastly over-
inclusive."' 122 Windfall recoveries do not only affront the purpose of medical
monitoring, they also "pose[] the real risk that little or no resources will be
available to compensate those who are truly injured."'123 In Metro-North, the
United States Supreme Court stated it was "troubled" by the effects of medi-
cal monitoring claims "upon interests of other potential plaintiffs who are not
before the court and who depend on a tort system that can distinguish be-
tween reliable and serious claims on the one hand, and unreliable and rela-
tively trivial claims on the other."'
124
Where a plaintiff alleges only exposure to a harmful substance-
particularly when the amount of exposure does not amount to a level suffi-
cient to cause disease-and presents no present physical injury to bolster the
claim, medical monitoring does not serve its purpose of being a cost-effective
tool to help cure or prevent the onset of disease. As such, medical monitoring
of a patient who presents no present physical injury strays far from the guid-
ance of the scientific and medical community.
1. Lump Sum Medical Monitoring Awards
Do Not Comport with Scientific and Medical Principles
of Effective Medical Monitoring for Disease
The greatest example of divergence of medical and legal thought in the
context of medical monitoring is the practice of awarding lump-sum medical
monitoring awards. Lump sum awards are starkly at odds with the traditional
scientific goal of medical monitoring and surveillance: detecting the onset of
disease.125 Medical experts point out the difference between the scientific
122. Maskin et al., supra note 5, at 529.
123. Id.; see also Harbour & Splittgerber, supra note 41, at 320 ("Awards to as-
ymptomatic plaintiffs who are the first to rush into court could consume all available
funds from defendants, leaving those plaintiffs who later have physical injuries with
nothing to recover."); HUGH R. WHITING, REMEDY WITHOUT RISK: AN OVERVIEW OF
MEDICAL MONITORING 29 (Wash. Legal Found., Contemporary Legal Notes Series
No. 42, Aug. 2002).
124. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 443-44 (1997).
125. The traditional goal of medical surveillance is to "monitor the spread of in-
fectious diseases through a population." GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 46, at 43. In
fact, even the word "surveillance literally means 'to watch over."' Id. Yet, the courts
giving medical monitoring lump sum awards by no means "watch over" the plaintiffs
and the plaintiffs' potential disease.
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approach and the approach of the courts that have awarded lump-sum medical
monitoring damages:
[C]ourts generally take little interest in the details of how compen-
sation is used to obtain medical care. Monetary damages in per-
sonal injury cases often include allowance for the plaintiffs future
health care costs, but how that money is spent is the plaintiffs
concern, not the court's. In contrast, public health is centrally con-
cerned with prevention of disease and injury, addresses itself to the
health of populations rather than specific individuals, and takes
great interest in the interventions used to achieve these goals. 126
There is no assurance that healthy plaintiffs will spend lump sum awards on
medical monitoring. If they do not, these awards are no more than a windfall
recovery. 27 Often, this is exactly what happens.
For example, the 1987 New Jersey Supreme Court case, Ayers v. Town-
ship of Jackson,128 illustrates the fact that lump-sum awards for medical
monitoring often may not lead to any medical monitoring whatsoever. In
Ayers, 339 plaintiffs, all without present physical injury, were awarded over
$8 million as a lump sum for medical monitoring. 29 Law review article
commentator George W.C. McCarter conducted an informal survey of the
126. Studdert et al., supra note 2, at 890. See generally McCarter, supra note 33,
at 253-54 (noting that courts can award medical monitoring based upon either public
health measure goals or the legal goals of deterrence or punishment).
127. See, e.g., Lilley v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 735 So. 2d 696 (La.
Ct. App. 1999). One year after the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized medical
monitoring as a cause of action in Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Industries, Inc. (Bourgeois
1), 716 So. 2d 355 (La. 1998), superseded by statute as stated in Edwards v. State,
804 So. 2d 886 (La. App. Ct. 2001), a trial court awarded a lump sum of $12,000 per
plaintiff for medical monitoring, Lilley, 735 So. 2d at 699, despite the fact the Bour-
geois I court expressly declined to extend its holding to claims for lump sum dam-
ages, Bourgeois 1, 716 So. 2d at 357 n.3. Fortunately, the award was overturned on
appeal. Lilley, 735 So. 2d at 706. The Louisiana Legislature recognized this problem
and in 1999--only one year after Bourgeois I-amended the Louisiana Civil Code
article 2315 (the portion of the Code specifying what damages may be awarded in a
civil case) to eliminate medical monitoring as a compensable item of damage in the
absence of a manifest physical or mental injury or disease. Bourgeois v. A.P. Green
Indus., Inc., 783 So. 2d 1251, 1255 (La. 2003) (Bourgeois 11); Bonnette v. Conoco,
Inc., 837 So. 2d 1219, 1230 n.6 (La. 2003). The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized
the amendment as forbidding medical monitoring claims. Id. The court, however, has
interpreted the amendment as prospective only and has allowed medical monitoring
claims to proceed when the claims accrued prior to the enactment of the amendment
on July 9, 1999. Bourgeois 11, 783 So. 2d at 1261 (allowing a medical monitoring
claim to proceed when the claim accrued prior to the date of the 1999 amendment).
128. 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
129. Id. at 291.
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plaintiffs after the lawsuit.' 30 The survey, however, garnered only three re-
sponses. 1 The three responses may be telling: one plaintiff noted that he
used his medical monitoring damages to buy a home and that after receiving
his award, he had not seen his doctor any more than in prior years.' 32 The two
other respondents, who could not even remember if the damages they re-
ceived were for medical monitoring, reported they did not see their doctors
more frequently as a result of the award.'
33
The American Law Institute ("ALl") has suggested that the plaintiffs in
Ayers did not appear to use their medical monitoring funds for health care. In
their study, Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury, the ALI Reporters
stated: "We do not favor awarding damages under the label of 'medical moni-
toring' and having the money paid directly to plaintiffs to be spent on addi-
tional medical attention only if they are so inclined,"'134 for "[tihis was report-
edly the eventual outcome of the litigation in Ayers v. Township of Jack-
son." 
13 5
The testimony of some plaintiffs who have sought medical monitoring
damages is an indicator of the level of their willingness to use any funds for
monitoring. In Ironbound Health Rights Advisory Commission v. Diamond
Shamrock Chemical Co., 136 "motion practice left medical monitoring as the
only damage claim remaining" for most of the ninety-seven plaintiffs in a
dioxin exposure suit.' 37 Testimony of the plaintiffs suggested an unwilling-
ness and lack of desire to be tested. In one plaintiffs deposition, the defense
attorney asked the plaintiff if he had ever been or ever wanted to be tested to
discover if he had any toxic substance in his body.' 38 The plaintiff seeking
medical monitoring replied, "I don't know. I don't know if I want to
know."'
139
At trial in the case, the plaintiffs were cross-examined about whether
they had ever expressed their concerns about their exposures to their doctors
in the time leading up to trial1 4° Time and time again, plaintiffs responded




134. 2 A.L.I., REPORTER'S STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL
INJURY 379 (1991) [hereinafter ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY]. Ultimately, however,
the ALI Reporters endorsed limited medical monitoring as a viable cause of action.
Id. at 381-82. Initially, the ALI Study would require medical monitoring to be estab-
lished by court-appointed experts or science panels. See id. at 379-80.
135. Id. at 379 n.59.
136. 578 A.2d 1248 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
137. See McCarter, supra note 33, at 270 n.212. The "case was settled during trial
on terms favorable to the [defendant]." Id. at 271 n.212.
138. Ironbound Health Rights Advisory Comm 'n, 578 A.2d at 1249.
139. Id.
140. McCarter, supra note 33, at 270 n.212.
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that they had not mentioned any such concerns, though they knew of the ex-
posures at the time of their appointments. 14 ' For instance, one plaintiffs tes-
timony revealed his seeming lack of concern:
Q: Did you discuss with the doctor your concerns about dioxin
exposure?
A: I had no reason to. I was there to get my bus license.'
42
Another plaintiff similarly did not mention his exposure to his doctor:
Q: Is that, in fact, true, that you did see a doctor for a physical
exam within the year preceding [your deposition in this case]?
A: Yes I guess, I've seen a doctor on occasion.
Q: Okay. Well, now, when you saw that doctor, you didn't men-
tion to him your concerns about exposure to dioxin, did you?
A: No, it was-didn't come to my mind.
143
Other plaintiffs gave similar testimony. 144 The fact that these plaintiffs did not
alert their doctors to their exposures during routine visits may suggest the
plaintiffs will not be quick to do so if they succeed in their medical monitor-
ing claims.
A similar example of plaintiffs showing unwillingness to engage in
medical monitoring occurred in Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.14 5 In
Hansen, workers sought medical monitoring because of asbestos exposure.
146
Nearly seven years after learning of their exposure, the plaintiffs participated
in only preliminary examinations revealing no asbestos-related illness.
147
Other than the preliminary tests, the plaintiffs underwent no further testing.
148
One commentator remarked of the plaintiffs' inaction: "The fact that none
had undergone testing over a period of almost seven years casts grave suspi-
cion over their assertions that they would use any medical monitoring sums






145. 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993).
146. Id. at 972-73.
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. Maskin et al., supra note 5, at 541-42.
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A final illustration of the use to which plaintiffs put their medical moni-
toring funds, when given the choice of how to use the money, shows once
again that the goals of medical monitoring will not be achieved if plaintiffs
are awarded a lump sum. In Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Air-
craft Corp.,150 a partial settlement occurred early on in the case, in which the
defendant provided $5,000 to each of the Vietnamese infants' guardians ad
litem. 151 The funds could be used either for the babies' medical treatment or
for their litigation expenses.' 52 "All of the money was used for litigation ex-
"'153
penses ....
These examples show that medical monitoring awards may not result in
the plaintiff actually being monitored. As one group of commentators noted:
The incentive for healthy plaintiffs to carefully hoard their award,
and faithfully spend it on periodic medical examinations to detect
an illness they will in all likelihood never contract, seems negligi-
ble. The far more enticing alternative, in most cases, will be to put
the money towards a new home, car or vacation. Visiting a physi-
cian is not something many people wish they could afford to do
more often.'
54
Lump-sum awards do not appear to further the goals of medical monitoring
programs.
2. Courts Awarding Medical Monitoring in the Absence
of Physical Injury Have Ignored the Mainstream Medical and
Scientific Community's Requirement that Medical Monitoring Only
Be Awarded if Its Benefits Outweigh Its Cost
Courts awarding medical monitoring in the absence of physical injury,
particularly in the form of lump sum damages, have awarded a negligible
health benefit at a great cost. The cost of such awards is high. For example, in
Ayers v. Township of Jackson,155 the plaintiffs were awarded $8 million for
medical monitoring. 156 This cost per plaintiff obviously compounds in the
150. 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
151. Id. at 820.
152. Id.
153. See Bill Charles Wells, The Grin Without the Cat: Claims for Damages from
Toxic Exposure Without Present Injury, 18 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L. 285, 307 n.150
(1994).
154. Maskin et al., supra note 5, at 540-43 (footnote omitted) (noting, "the poten-
tial for abuse" is apparent).
155. 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
156. Id. at 291.
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context of aggregated litigation. 57 Costs also include the real risk that re-
sources may run dry for injured claimants because of the potential for so
many individuals to become claimants.158 This cost is astronomical compared
to the dubious health benefits to patients, particularly to claimants who re-
ceive lump sums or who already receive monitoring funds through insurance
coverage. 159
III. COURTS ARE NOT EQUIPPED TO ADDRESS THE MANY
UNCERTAINTIES AND DIFFICULTIES OF IMPLEMENTING
MEDICAL MONITORING CAUSES OF ACTION
Medical monitoring, absent present physical injury, presents an about-
face to two hundred years of American tort law. It also raises complicated
questions begging for in-depth scientific input. As commentators have noted:
Clearly, deterrence of polluters and amelioration of disease should
be encouraged by our legal system. However, encouraging litiga-
tion is not necessarily the best way to achieve these laudable goals.
When judges feel forced to make decisions that eliminate a basic
requirement of tort causes of action, namely, the presence of in-
jury, in order to compensate plaintiffs, it is time to reevaluate the
direction our political and legal institutions are taking.
60
Courts are institutions suited to adjudicate rights of the individual par-
ties. They are not, however, able to provide in-depth study and a comprehen-
sive solution to a public policy matter affecting many interested parties.
Medical monitoring, if instituted as a cause of action at all, should be insti-
tuted by state legislatures, not the courts.
157. See Studdert et al., supra note 2, at 890 (Studdert's article notes "the shift to
contemplate future harms would be little more than an intriguing doctrinal develop-
ment were it not for the context in which claims of medical monitoring generally
arise-aggregated litigation. Over the past 20 years, private referral arrangements,
class action lawsuits, and court-overseen consolidation have changed the face of per-
sonal injury litigation, allowing attorneys to pursue lawsuits on behalf of hundreds,
thousands, even tens of thousands of similarly situated plaintiffs for damages and
attorney compensation on a scale previously unknown.") (endnotes omitted); Hender-
son & Twerski, supra note 116, at 848 ("[mass tort and toxic tort] medical monitoring
claims may turn out to be uniquely suited to class action treatment").
158. See Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 442 (1997);
Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 830-31 (Ala. 2001).
159. See generally McCarter, supra note 33, at 257 n. 158.
160. Susan L. Martin & Jonathan D. Martin, Tort Actionsfor Medical Monitoring:
Warranted or Wasteful?, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 121, 121 (1995).
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A. Allowing Medical Monitoring Claims in Cases in Which There Is
No Present Injury Constitutes a Sweeping Change to Two Hundred
Years of Tort Law that Warrants Legislative Consideration
For much of this nation's history, courts developed tort law in a slow,
incremental fashion. In recent years, however, some courts have abandoned
this incremental approach. This has resulted in potentially large adverse con-
sequences to the nation's civil justice system and to those who must abide by
its rules.
For over two hundred years, a fundamental principle of tort law has
been that a person must be injured to hold another person liable. The reason
for this basic rule is simple: in order to determine whether money should be
transferred from a defendant to a plaintiff, a jury needs some objective mani-
festation that an individual has been harmed. Medical monitoring claims,
however, "reject[] the prerequisite of palpable harm," eschewing "several
time-honored tenets of personal injury litigation."' 61 As Professors Henderson
and Twerski note:
any attempt to embrace [medical monitoring] within the main-
stream of traditional tort law is manifestly unwise. In truth, [medi-
cal monitoring claims] constitute radical departures from long-
standing norms of tort law, advanced in recent years to bludgeon a
disfavored group of defendants. But the wrongdoing of a defen-
dant, or defendants, does not justify creating legal doctrine that is
substantively unfair, especially when doing so strikes mercilessly
at another group of plaintiffs who, when the funds to pay damages
run dry, will be denied recovery for real, rather than anticipated,
ills. 162
Allowing an award where a plaintiff currently suffers no harm and has no
symptoms of harm is an abrupt change from a fundamental principle of tort
law. Such a sweeping change warrants legislative consideration.
Asbestos provides an example of the grave harm that can result from a
drastic change to long-established legal principles. Early in the asbestos liti-
161. Studdert et al., supra note 2, at 890, 894. See also Martin & Martin, supra
note 160, at 125. The minority view of West Virginia, that increased risk of future
injury from exposure to a toxin is akin to a physical injury from a car accident, is
unfounded. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 116, at 841. As Professors Hender-
son and Twerski wrote, "[f]rom the beginnings of our negligence jurisprudence, 'in-jury' has been synonymous with 'harm' and connotes physical impairment or dys-
function, or mental upset, pain and suffering resulting from such harm." Id. at 841-42.
It has been the "linchpin in determining the duties of care owed by defendants." Id. at
842. Allowing a claim without injury should be "neither 'only remedial' nor 'business
as usual."' Id.
162. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 116, at 818.
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gation, courts empathetic to the claims of asbestos plaintiffs deviated from
accepted legal principles to permit recoveries that traditionally would have
been barred.163 While the courts in such cases undoubtedly had good inten-
tions, the litigation turned into a judicial "disaster of major proportions."164
Unimpaired plaintiffs flooded the tort system, causing about seventy employ-
ers so far to file for bankruptcy protection, and putting disproportionate fi-
nancial pressure on newer "peripheral defendants."' 165 Filings by the unim-
paired have depleted funds needed to compensate the truly sick, now and in
the future.' 66 The problem of separating out and quickly assisting the seri-
ously injured plaintiffs was so great that the judiciary sought congressional
intervention to address this crisis, explaining that the "courts [were] ill-
equipped to meet [the crisis] effectively."' 67 The legacy of the asbestos lesson
continues and should be instructive in the medical monitoring context.
B. Courts Are Not Equipped to Answer the Many Questions
Involved in Allowing Medical Monitoring Claims
Implementing a medical monitoring program involves complex medical
understanding. As doctors note, "[f]inal scientific selection of [medical moni-
toring] test strategies . . . could only be made based on results of observa-
163. See Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, A Letter to the Nation's Trial
Judges: How the Focus on Efficiency Is Hurting You and Innocent Victims in Asbes-
tos Liability Cases, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 247 (2000).
164. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION,
REPORT OF THE AD Hoc COMMITTEE 2 (1991).
165. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS AND
COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM REPORT 20 (RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, 2002); Mark
A. Behrens & Rochelle M. Tedesco, Two Forks in the Road of Asbestos Litigation, 18
MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS 1, 1-3 (Mar. 7, 2003); Christopher F. Edley, Jr. &
Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion-Dollar Crisis, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 383,
392 (1993); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 116, at 845 ("If the past decade of
asbestos litigation has taught us anything, it is that the appetites of the plaintiff's bar
know no limits in the ongoing search for secondary and even tertiary generations of
defendants against whom to bring massive collective actions on new and expanding
legal theories.").
166. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 875, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16590, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2002) ("filing of mass screening cases is
tantamount to a race to the courthouse and has the effect of depleting funds, some
already stretched to the limit, which would otherwise be available for compensation to
deserving plaintiffs"); Mark A. Behrens, Some Proposals for Courts Interested in
Helping Sick Claimants and Solving Serious Problems in Asbestos Litigation, 54
BAYLOR L. REv. 331 (2002).
167. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION, supra
note 164, at 2.
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tional or experimental, clinical, outcome-based research aimed at evaluating
medical and economic risks, costs and benefits., 168
The courts are not fit to answer all the questions arising with the imple-
mentation of a medical monitoring system. The Journal of the American
Medical Association notes, "[t]he accurate sorting of strong and weak cases
for medical monitoring requires careful examination of relevant medical and
epidemiological evidence. Previous experience in toxic tort cases creates
some reason to doubt courts' competence in this area."' 169 One legal commen-
tator aptly concluded, "courtrooms are the last place where medicine shouldbe practiced, where prescriptions should be written and tests ordered." 70
1. Courts Cannot Effectively Answer the Question:
"For Which Diseases Should Medical Monitoring Be Available?"
When courts make bright-line rules allowing medical monitoring for all
types of diseases, they disregard the critical medical understanding that medi-
cal monitoring is only appropriate for curable or treatable disease. These de-
cisions display a critical misunderstanding of the purpose of medical monitor-
ing and illustrate that courts do not have access to all the information they
need to make wise decisions about appropriate medical monitoring.
Courts allowing medical monitoring claims must make scientific deci-
sions about which treatment is proper for specific plaintiffs. In some cases,
plaintiffs' lawyers deluge the court with a battery of diagnostic tests they
would like to see the court allow for their clients.' 71 Critics have suggested
that "[tihe all-too-transparent method behind this madness [is] to inflate as
much as possible the cost of yearly monitoring per plaintiff so as to maximize
plaintiffs' damage award and their attorneys' contingent fees."'172 Courts must
then decipher which of these suggested tests to channel the plaintiff toward
by "scrutiniz[ing] the clinical efficacy of the [suggested diagnostic tests] and,
in some cases, even the treatments planned to follow identification of dis-
168. Beeler & Sappenfield, supra note 7, at 287.
169. Studdert et al., supra note 2, at 892 (citing articles regarding the clash be-
tween science and the law in breast implant cases and toxic tort causation).
170. THOMAS M. GOUTMAN, MEDICAL MONITORING: How BAD SCIENCE MAKES
BAD LAW 16 (2001).
171. The plaintiffs in In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 113 F.3d 444 (3d Cir.
1997), requested the following diagnostic tests for their feared PCB exposure: "am-
niocentesis, developmental and achievement testing, electrocardiography, pulmonary
function tests, mammography, sigmoidoscopy, urine cytology, sputum cytology,
'basic immunotoxicology panel,' 'chromosomal analysis,' complete 'optomologic
evaluation,' complete 'cardiovascular evaluation,' complete 'neurological evaluation,'
complete 'gastrointestinal evaluation,' PCB 'detoxification,' urinalysis, PSA, CBC,
urine porphyrin, and male fertility evaluation." GOUTMAN, supra note 170, at 14-15.
172. GOUTMAN, supra note 170, at 15.
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ease." 173 Adding complexity, this determination will change over time with
emerging cures and treatments for current diseases and with the introduction
of new types of diseases. 
174
The courts are not equipped to make these kinds of decisions, which re-
quire the reasonable input of physicians, epidemiologists, and other ex-
perts.' 75 State legislatures are better-suited to undertake this analysis than the
courts. Legislatures have the capacity to examine, and then reexamine, the
medical literature and call, then recall, medical and scientific witnesses.
Unlike the courts, legislatures can consider the interests of all affected by any
pending legislation.
2. Courts Cannot Effectively Answer the Question:
"What Criteria Should Be Used to Determine Whether
Medical Monitoring Is Appropriate in a Given Case?"
Recognition of a medical monitoring claim may require courts to detail
the criteria for when recovery is allowed, since open-ended recovery could
deluge the courts with claims. Such criteria will be impossible to put into a
judicial opinion and challenging to even put into legislation.
Unless clear criteria for medical monitoring claims are established, a
flood of new lawsuits is likely to come.1 76 Medical monitoring claims could
have potentially gigantic proportions because "[t]he specter of a massive,
never-ending que [sic] of claimants is very real."' 177 As the United States Su-
preme Court has recognized, "tens of millions of individuals may have suf-
fered exposure to substances that might justify some form of substance-
exposure-related medical monitoring."' 78 People are "exposed to potential
health hazards each day through the air they breathe, water they drink, food
and drugs they ingest, and on the land on which they live."' 179 Because so
many individuals may qualify as potential medical monitoring claimants,
contingency fee attorneys will be able to recruit people off the street to serve
as plaintiffs. No longer would plaintiffs' attorneys have to wait for injury to
file suit. The familiar advertisement, "Have you been injured?" could be-
come, "Don't wait until you're hurt, call now!"' 
80
173. Studdert et al., supra note 2, at 890.
174. See generally Beeler & Sappenfield, supra note 7, at 287.
175. See generally Harbour & Splittgerber, supra note 41, at 320.
176. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 116, at 845 ("[C]ourts will face, in the
long run, an overwhelming flood of litigation in this area.").
177. Id. at 850.
178. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 442 (1997).
179. Terry Christovich Gay & Paige Freeman Rosato, Combatting Fear of Future
Injury in Medical Monitoring Claims, 61 DEF. CouNs. J. 554, 562 (1994).
180. Victor Schwartz, Some Lawyers Ask, Why Wait for Injury? Sue Now!, USA
TODAY, July 15, 1999, at A17.
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As a result, courts are likely to become clogged with speculative medi-
cal monitoring claims. Access to justice for those with present, serious physi-
cal injuries may be delayed or denied.' 8' As one court that rejected medical
monitoring stated:
There is little doubt that millions of people have suffered expo-
sure to hazardous substances. Obviously, allowing individuals
who have not suffered any demonstrable injury from such expo-
sure to recover the costs of future medical monitoring in a civil
action could potentially devastate the court system as well as de-
fendants .... [T]here must be a realization that such defendants'
pockets or bank accounts do not contain infinite resources. Al-
lowing today's generation of exposed but uninjured plaintiffs to
recover may lead to tomorrow's generation of exposed and in-
jured plaintiff's [sic] being remediless.' 82
The enormity of the potential claims requires a thorough study of who should
be eligible for medical monitoring.
Even if one believes that courts can effectively compose a list of criteria
to stem the avalanche of medical monitoring cases and govern the monitoring
of the spectrum of diseases, 8 3 there are broad public policy issues and com-
plexities involved that a court cannot adequately resolve. For instance, a clear
and sound "trigger" must be set to identify the circumstances under which a
181. The Alabama Supreme Court realized that "a 'flood' of less important cases"
would drain the pool of resources available for meritorious claims by plaintiffs with
serious, present injury and would adversely affect the allocation of scarce medical
resources. Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 831 (Ala. 2001).
182. Ball v. Joy Mfg. Co., 755 F. Supp. 1344, 1372 (S.D. W. Va. 1990) (applying
Virginia law), affd sub nom. Ball v. Joy Techs. Inc., 958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1991).
183. We believe the best court-established criteria were set forth in the diet drug
litigation for use in evaluating the fairness of a class action settlement that established
a complicated compensation and medical screening program. See In re Diet Drugs
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593, 2000 US Dist. LEXIS 12275 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28,
2000). There, the judge found the medical monitoring scheme was fair because it met
each of the following criteria, namely whether (1) the disease in question progresses
asymptomatically following toxic exposure; (2) a diagnostic test with high sensitivity
exists; (3) the exposed population has a relatively high prevalence of disease; (4) the
diagnostic test therefore has a high predictive value; (5) the test is relatively low-cost;
(6) medical monitoring could be integrated into standard clinical follow-up of those
with disease; (7) monitoring could lead to early preventive care; and (8) monitoring
allows for the appropriate timing of definitive treatment. Id. at * 166-67. The Journal
of the American Medical Association found these stringent criteria to be "consonant
with sound epidemiological principles and the best available scientific knowledge of
the disease at issue. They also resonate with health policy recommendations for the
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claimant is eligible for a medical monitoring award for different types of dis-
ease. Setting a "trigger" to allow the monitoring of specific diseases for indi-
viduals with different exposures and at-risk characteristics will require access
to information from numerous sources only partially available to courts. Even
to a legislature, equipped with the resources to initiate broad information
gathering, the task of establishing a trigger for the monitoring of all types of
diseases will be daunting. Still, a legislature is better suited for this mission
than the courts.
Courts that have permitted recovery for medical monitoring have recog-
nized the problem of potentially open-ended recovery and have established
certain criteria in an attempt to confine claims.184 Yet, they have not demon-
strated an ability to articulate consistent eligibility requirements for medical
monitoring. 8 5 As a result, medical monitoring "triggers" established by
courts will invariably lead to inconsistent decisions among jurisdictions, caus-
ing disparate treatment of similarly situated plaintiffs and costly litigation as
parties attempt to clarify their rights and duties. 186 Further, these triggers will
184. See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824-25 (Cal.
1993) (listing five factors to determine the reasonableness and necessity of medical
monitoring); Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., 716 So. 2d 355, 360-61 (La. 1998)
(establishing seven criteria necessary for recovery of medical monitoring damages),
superseded by statute as stated in Edwards v. State, 804 So. 2d 886 (La. App. Ct.
2001); Redland Soccer Club v. Dep't of the Army of the United States, 696 A.2d 137,
145-46 (Pa. 1997) (setting forth seven factors a plaintiff must establish in order to
prevail on a claim for medical monitoring). When courts set forth generalized factors,
they often do not specify whether each element must be separately established, or
whether all factors should be weighed together. See McCarter, supra note 33, at 265.
185. For example, courts usually require a showing of "increased risk" for disease.
See, e.g., Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468, 1477 (D. Colo. 1991);
Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979 (Utah 1993). One court
required the plaintiffs to show it was "reasonably certain" they would develop the
need for medical monitoring. Potter, 863 P.2d at 823. Under any of these court-
established standards, "[i]t is . . . difficult to quantify the amount of increased risk
imposed on an individual who does not yet have a disease." Allan Kanner, Medical
Monitoring: State and Federal Perspectives, in LITIGATION 549, 560 (PLI Litig. &
Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 363, 1988). Further, it is "difficult to
conceptualize what that risk is worth in money damages," id., especially where plain-
tiffs are being compensated .' for injuries which have not yet occurred and which...
probably never will."' Carey C. Jordan, Comment, Medical Monitoring in Toxic Tort
Cases: Another Windfall for Texas Plaintiffs?, 33 HOUS. L. REv. 473, 487 (1996)
(quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 274 Cal. Rptr. 885, 896 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991), rev'd, 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993)) (alteration in original).
186. A lack of consistency and specificity in judicially-created eligibility stan-
dards has proved disastrous in asbestos litigation. Trials essentially have become
"games of chance" because of the lack of clearly delineated standards for recovery.
Even when similarly situated plaintiffs have tried their cases in the same jurisdiction,
awards have been inconsistent. Cf Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis:
Is There a Need for an Administrative Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 1819, 1852-
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inevitably change over time as scientific and medical knowledge expands. 187
Legislatures are better equipped than courts to consider the scientific and
medical information necessary to set a "trigger" and to change these "trig-
gers" as scientific knowledge progresses.
3. Courts Cannot Effectively Answer the Question:
"How Should a Medical Monitoring Program Be Administered?"
Allowing medical monitoring claims involves innumerable questions of
how a given medical monitoring program will be administered. Developing
such a program would be virtually impossible for courts, and daunting even
to legislatures armed with the benefit of committee hearings and the ability to
call numerous experts to testify.
Devising a sound medical monitoring plan would require, at a minimum,
specifying the nature and amount of benefits available, the source of funding
and funding allotments, the procedures for determining eligibility for moni-
toring, the payment mechanism for the provider and the percentage of pro-
vider reimbursement, when eligible parties may join the program, the length
of time the program should last, the frequency of any periodic monitoring and
the circumstances in which the frequency can be changed to allow special
monitoring, the content of the monitoring exams, whether the facility testing
will be formal or informal, and whether the service provider is to be desig-
nated by the court or chosen by the claimant.'
88
Additionally, as a medical monitoring program matures, its scope and
administrative operation will inevitably require adjustments, particularly if
the program's designers erroneously estimate funding needs or the number of
eligible participants. Administration requires much more flexibility and guid-
ance than a court can give. Administrative intricacies compound in the in-
stance of medical monitoring class actions, where courts would have to man-
age each class member's monitoring program, a task that would place "addi-
tional strains on courts that should be hesitant to undertake such a costly and
time-consuming responsibility."' '
89
Establishing a soundly administered program is far beyond the capacity
of the courts. Instead, it is best left to the legislature.
59 (1992) (discussing the different treatment accorded pleural plaque claims in differ-
ent jurisdictions).
187. See generally GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 46, at 43; Beeler & Sappen-
field, supra note 7, at 287.
188. See Beeler & Sappenfield, supra note 7, at 286-87; Krieger et al., supra note
11, at 113-15; Jesse R. Lee, Medical Monitoring Damages: Issues Concerning the
Administration of Medical Monitoring Programs, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 251, 267-72
(1994); Studdert et al., supra note 2, at 892.
189. Harbour & Splittgerber, supra note 41, at 320.
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IV. IF THERE IS A NEED FOR NEW MEDICAL MONITORING RIGHTS,
IT SHOULD BE A LEGISLATIVE MATTER
When courts have allowed recovery for medical monitoring, they have
often produced results allowing for unlimited recoveries, resulting in an ava-
lanche of claims.190 Legislatures are in a better position to address the many
complexities of medical monitoring and to stymie snowballing claims.
A. The Legislature Is the Proper Forum to Conduct Hearings and
Bring in Experts to Address the Many Questions Involved in Allowing
Medical Monitoring Claims
The questions medical monitoring raises are difficult and complex. A
medical monitoring scheme requires delineating the types of diseases that
may be monitored, the tests used in monitoring, and the continuing admini-
stration of each patient's monitoring program. These issues are extremely
broad and are not totally within judicial control.
Courts are well-suited to adjudicate individual disputes concerning dis-
crete issues and parties. Lawyers in the courtroom advocate the interests of
their clients and present experts of the same mind. A court, when faced with
implementing a medical monitoring scheme, is guided only by the "battle of
the experts" the plaintiff and defendant provide. 191 The particularized focus of
the judiciary deprives the court of comprehensive access to information es-
sential to the formation of complex tort policy rules.
On the other hand, legislatures are well-equipped to reach fully in-
formed decisions about the need for widespread changes in the law. They
have more complete access to information, including the ability to call wit-
nesses and receive comments from persons representing a multiplicity of
perspectives.' 92 As a result, they can engage in the effectiveness and cost-
190. This was the case after West Virginia allowed medical monitoring in Bower
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 432-33 (W. Va. 1999). Shortly after
Bower, plaintiffs' lawyers filed a class-action suit against the major cigarette manu-
facturers on behalf of approximately 250,000 West Virginia smokers who had not
been diagnosed with any smoking-related illnesses, seeking medical monitoring dam-
ages. See In re Tobacco Litig. (Medical Monitoring Cases), No. 00-C-6000 (W. Va.
Cir. Ct. 2001).
191. Patricia E. Lin, Note, Opening the Gates to Scientific Evidence in Toxic Ex-
posure Cases: Medical Monitoring and Daubert, 17 REv. LITIG. 551, 568 (1998).
192. If the issue came before a legislature, all interested parties would have the
opportunity to provide input on the issue. For instance, insurance companies could
come forward to testify about the impact on the insurance industry of medical moni-
toring claims against their policyholders. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental
Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 942, 972-73 (1988); Kathe-
rine B. Posner & Robert S. Bennett, Liability and Insurance Coverage for Medical
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benefit analyses required by scientists and doctors for the implementation of
any medical monitoring program much better than courts can. With their su-
perior access to information, legislatures are in the best position to consider
whether a medical monitoring remedy is needed and if so, how to resolve its
many complexities.
B. The Legislature Will Prospectively Address the Issue of Medical
Monitoring, Providing Fair Warning to Potential Defendants
Medical monitoring is a topic well-suited for the legislature because it is
an inherently prospective concept and it involves a change to long-standing
principles of tort law. Medical monitoring is a distinctly prospective claim
aimed at preventing future disease. It does not involve compensation for cur-
rent harm, but "introduces prospective action."' 93 In the courts, "[t]ort law's
retrospective focus means that it has rarely been able to serve prevention
goals."'194 Medical monitoring, with its inherent prospective purpose of pre-
vention, is better suited to legislative remedy.
Allowing medical monitoring claims also involves a change to funda-
mental principles of tort law. The courts' retroactive focus, although possibly
appropriate when implementing minor adjustments to common law princi-
ples, is not appropriate when the "adjustments" precipitate a broad, funda-
mental change in an available tort remedy. If the tort system adopts the novel
remedy of medical monitoring, thereby denoting a sweeping change to the
rights and responsibilities of the public, the change should be done prospec-
tively to provide "fair notice" to those potentially affected. This is particularly
true since medical monitoring poses the potential for enormous expense to
defendants. 195 This great expense harms not only defendants, but also future
Monitoring Awards: Will Policyholders Get Relief?, 7 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 19, 25
(1995).
193. Studdert et al., supra note 2, at 890.
194. Id.
195. Commentators have noted that if courts drop the injury element from medical
monitoring cases, defendants will become liable for potentially astronomical costs,
because "we may all have reasonable grounds to allege that some negligent business
exposed us to hazardous substances." Martin & Martin, supra note 160, at 130-31
(noting the amount of unwarranted expense is compounded when this cause of action
is available to many people whose exposure to naturally occurring substances or
whose own conduct may put them at greater risk of disease than their limited expo-
sure to a possible carcinogen attributable to a municipality or business with deep
pockets); Maskin et al., supra note 5, at 529 ("Most people are thus legitimate poten-
tial medical monitoring plaintiffs, a clear indication that the boundaries of this poten-
tial tort remedy must be narrowly drawn to prevent it spiraling out of control."). An
example of the "enormity of the universe of potential medical monitoring plaintiffs"
is the amount of hazardous chemicals and waste with which the public comes into
contact. Id. at 528. The Environmental Protection Agency has reported that "billions
of pounds of hazardous chemicals are released into the air each year." Id. It "further
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claimants. Professors Henderson and Twerski have warned that "as the mas-
sive number of uninjured claimants presenting anticipatory claims devours
the defendants' resources, those defendants are forced into bankruptcy leav-
ing nothing for those whose ills, when they eventually manifest themselves,
are not the least bit speculative.' 96 Thus, this potential for enormous expense
"begs for a legislative solution rather than a judicial one."' 197
C. The Legislature Is the Proper Forum to Address the
Very Need for Medical Monitoring, Given the Collateral Source Rule
If a party's costs for medical monitoring are already covered by an em-
ployer or health care insurer and there is no proof of injury, a basic public
policy question arises as to whether the "collateral source rule" should apply.
Under this rule, a claimant's insurance benefits, workers' compensation bene-
fits, and government benefits are not deducted when calculating the amount
of the claimant's damages owed by the tortfeasor, since the tortfeasor did not
pay for those benefits.' When the "collateral source rule" applies, the plain-
tiff gets funds from the insurance company as well as damages from the de-
fendants, allowing essentially a double-recovery.
Those who advocate medical monitoring as a cause of action "have cited
the unfairness of requiring plaintiffs to bear the costs of medical diagnostic
examinations which, but for the defendant's actions, they would not be com-
pelled to undergo. This rationale obviously assumes that plaintiffs do indeed
incur the expenses associated with medical monitoring .... ,,199 But, "medical
reports that nearly 20 percent of the U.S. population (approximately 40 million peo-
ple) live within four miles of a hazardous waste site on the National Priority List." Id.;
Paul J. Komyatte, Medical Monitoring Damages: An Evolution of Environmental Tort
Law, 23 COLO. LAW. 1533, 1533 (1994) (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES & PUBLIC HEALTH (Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry, Atlanta, Ga.), May/June 1992, at 1).
196. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 116, at 850.
197. Martin & Martin, supra note 160, at 131. Also, in Ball v. Joy Technologies,
Inc., 958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1991), the Fourth Circuit recognized the economic hard-
ship that eliminating the physical injury requirement in medical monitoring cases
would impose upon defendants and emphasized the appropriateness of legislative
consideration.
198. See John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort
Law, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1478, 1478 (1966). A plaintiff, however, does not necessarily
receive double recovery when the collateral source rule is applied. Health insurance
contracts, for example, may provide that the insurer is to be subrogated to the in-
sured's tort claim. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND
SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 542 (10th ed. 2000).
199. Maskin et al., supra note 5, at 526 (footnote omitted).
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monitoring may be an entirely redundant remedy for those who already have
health insurance."
2°°
For those who do not have health insurance, coverage for such monitor-
ing is a social problem that legislatures are best-equipped to address. The
United States Supreme Court suggested this approach in Metro-North Com-
muter Railroad. Co. v. Buckley, when it said: "where state and federal regula-
tions already provide the relief that a [medical monitoring] plaintiff seeks,
creating a full-blown tort remedy could entail systemic costs without corre-
sponding benefits" because recovery would be allowed "irrespective of the




Medical monitoring, to the majority of scientists and doctors, is a spe-
cific tool useful in diagnosing disease at a point when diagnosis potentially
can lead to effective treatment or cure the disease. Medical monitoring is only
appropriate where its benefits outweigh both its risks and its cost. Such pro-
grams should be tailored to specific diseases and individuals, and should be
flexible enough to adapt to advances in scientific understanding about the
treatment and diagnosis of disease.
The passage of time since a few courts adopted medical monitoring has
shown that it is the wrong remedy in the wrong forum. Courts should follow
the recent lead of the United States Supreme Court and the state supreme
courts of Nevada, Alabama, and Kentucky and reject the medical monitoring
claims of plaintiffs who do not have present physical injury. This approach is
cognizant of the scientific and medical goals of a medical monitoring pro-
gram. Courts are not the place to introduce a drastic change to tort law by
allowing a claim absent present physical injury. Courts cannot answer the
many questions posed by implementing medical monitoring as a new cause of
action. A medical monitoring cause of action, if implemented at all, should be
implemented by the legislature.
200. Id. at 528. In fact, approximately 80 percent of all standard medical testing is
paid for by third party insurance. See ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 134, at
379.
201. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424,443 (1997).
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